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LOCO LABELS AND MARKETING 
MADNESS: IMPROVING HOW CONSUMERS 
INTERPRET INFORMATION IN THE 
AMERICAN FOOD ECONOMY 
Margaret Sova McCabe  
Don’t you hate that dragging feeling at the end of a long 
workday—tired, hungry, drained, and wishing for a four-star 
dinner that won’t make you feel guilty? One night, knowing I 
would not be eating that dinner, I settled on a quick trip to the 
grocery for at least a nutritious and eco-friendly meal. I scanned 
the aisles looking for a decent dinner that could be made quickly at 
home. In less than ten minutes I was in line and feeling great 
because my basket was laden with purchases prudent for both me, 
physically, and for the environment. In my basket were Kashi pesto 
pasta (the box said ―all natural‖ and had healthy whole grain 
goodness), organic salad greens (although in a cellophane bag, 
the no pesticides claim made me feel good), light dressing (low fat, 
of course), organic fat free milk (enough said), and some Late July 
dark chocolate cookies (at least they were organic!). While I 
thought I could have had a bit less processed food, at least the 
choices were responsible—claims of whole grains, all natural, and 
pesticide free abounded. 
As I waited in the checkout line, I smugly surveyed the basket 
of the man in front of me—Mr. Conventional, I decided to call him. 
He had steak and potato canned soup (people really eat that?), 
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some bagged iceberg salad (isn’t that just water?), Greek salad 
dressing (did he know how much fat that had?), store brand whole 
milk (ditto), and Oreos (ok, I love Oreos). ―What a nutritional 
nightmare,‖ I thought to myself, feeling even better about my 
healthy choices. 
When I got home, my husband commented that he hoped I had 
picked up something good for my late dinner. Well, I launched into 
my healthy choice speech—organics, whole grains, pesticide free, 
antibiotic free! I even recounted my observations about Mr. 
Conventional. My husband, who is the pragmatist in the marriage, 
eyed me (and my receipt for $19.95) skeptically. ―How do you 
know you made out so much better?‖ he asked (I think he was 
feeling defensive). I quickly pointed out the labels—whole grains, 
antibiotic free, low fat! He just laughed and said something about 
me being ―a marketing department’s dream.‖  
As a wife and a lawyer, I prefer not to be wrong. While 
microwaving the pasta, I set about proving to my husband that I 
had not succumbed to mere marketing madness or crazy labeling 
schemes. And wouldn’t you know, there wasn’t much difference 
between Mr. Conventional and me.
1
 My purchases cost $19.95. 
And, if I ate only the serving sizes, I would consume 605 calories, 
1545 mg sodium, 19.5 g fat, and 32 g sugar. Mr. Conventional? He 
paid $13.17. Assuming he ate only the serving sizes, he would 
consume 625 calories, 1465 mg sodium, 32.5 g fat, 34 g sugar. 
There was not much difference, except his wallet was in slightly 
better shape. 
These numbers did not stack up in my favor. Sure, I had fewer 
fat calories and overall calories, but not by much! I spent more, 
but for what? Deflated about my feel-good grocery store trip, I 
started thinking like a lawyer about my purchases. What shaped 
my perceptions? What food information did I really know? What 
laws regulated this information? And, how about Mr. 
Conventional? How did he make his choices? Could we both have 
made better choices if we had more information? 
                                                        
1 See Appendix A infra for a breakdown of the cost and nutritional 
information for the purchases. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: WHY CARE ABOUT FOOD LABELS? 
Most Westerners eat primarily processed foods.
2
 Since the 
manufacturers of these foods prepare much of what America eats, 
consumers rely on labels to determine what they are consuming. 
The purpose of these labels is three-fold: (1) providing health, 
safety, and economic information; (2) protecting consumers from 
deceptive or fraudulent marketing; and (3) promoting fair 
economic competition and marketing.
3
 America‘s growing obesity 
epidemic, however, signals lawmakers, manufacturers, and 
consumers that the country is making poor dietary choices despite 
access to nutritional information through labels.  
To improve the efficiency of the food economy
4—and 
consequently public and environmental health—lawmakers, with 
the support of manufacturers and consumers, should make two 
principal changes to current labeling policies. The Federal 
government should: (1) adopt front-of-package, simplified nutrient 
labeling clearly cuing consumers about products‘ healthfulness or 
lack thereof, and (2) make greater use of marketing logos to 
disclose product production methods, particularly when the food 
has special attributes such as organic production or the absence of 
genetically engineered ingredients. Taking these steps would 
provide consumers with more information, and with more 
information consumers would likely make more informed 
purchases. As a result, manufacturers would be able to make 
                                                        
2 See MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 12 (2006); MICHAEL POLLAN, IN 
DEFENSE OF FOOD 106–14 (2008); see generally RAJ PATEL, STUFFED & 
STARVED 1–6 (2007); ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 3–10 (2002). 
3 ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP‘T OF AGRIC., ECONOMICS OF FOOD 
LABELING, (2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer793/ 
AER793.pdf; Edna Einsiedel, Consumers and GM Food Labels: Providing 
Information or Sowing Confusion?, 3 AG. BIO FORUM 231, 231 (2000), 
available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v3n4/v3n4a09-einsiedel.pdf. 
4 For the purposes of this article, I use the term ―food economy‖ to refer to 
the transactional relationships between food producer, food consumer, and 
government as regulator. See generally Marc T. Law, The Origins of State Pure 
Food Regulation, 4 J. ECON. HIST. 1103 (2003) (hypothesizing that 19th Century 
food laws were motivated by the desire to address asymmetric information 
between producers and consumers). 
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products that consumers demand, rather than developing products 
and generating demand through marketing. The continuation of 
poor consumer choices results in an inefficient food economy that 
promotes consumption, regardless of health consequences. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) controls the most 
meaningful food label and marketing information
5
 for average 
consumers. As is often the case in areas of government regulation, 
the agency serves as the initial information broker—it mandates 
what labels must disclose to consumers and how that disclosure 
takes place, as well as prohibits certain disclosures or claims.
6
 In 
this way, the government interferes with what would otherwise be 
a free market. Of course, there are compelling reasons for this, 
such as public health, safety, and moral concerns.
7
   
The danger, however, is the resulting imbalance known to 
economists as ―asymmetric information.‖8 This information 
                                                        
5 E.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 341 
(2006) (―Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action will promote 
honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, he shall promulgate 
regulations fixing and establishing for any food, under its common or usual 
name so far as practicable, a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a 
reasonable standard of quality, or reasonable standards of fill of container.‖); 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 
2353 (1990). 
6 See Christine Moorman, A Quasi Experiment to Assess the Consumer and 
Informational Determinants of Nutrition Information Processing Attributes, 15 
J. PUB. P. & MKTG. 28, 29 (1996) (analyzing the effect of mandated food label 
information on consumer choices); Christine Moorman & Linda L. Pierce, 
Consumer Policy and Consumer Segment Interactions, 8 J. PUB. P. & MKTG. 
181, 182–83 (1989) (providing specific examples of Federal Trade Commission 
approaches to regulating consumer information); see generally GEORGE J. 
BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS (1999) (analyzing and critiquing 
how the government regulates the flow of information between consumers and 
the financial services industry and making proposals for more consumer 
friendly, less costly reforms).  
7 See GOLAN, supra note 3, at 1 (―In recent years, government intervention 
in labeling has begun to target a new purpose, namely, influencing individual 
consumption choices to align them with social objectives.‖); S. Andrew 
Starbird, Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 15, 16 (2005) (noting that imperfect information leads to less food 
safety). 
8 ―Asymmetric information‖ is a theory that explains marketplace behavior. 
MCCABE_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:46 PM 
 LOCO LABELS AND MARKETING MADNESS 497 
imbalance in turn creates the phenomenon of adverse selection, 
whereby consumers select low quality goods due to incomplete or 
dishonest information.
9
 This article argues that the current law and 
policies of our food economy have enabled the development of ―an 
adverse selection of low-quality products,‖ at least from public 
health and consumer choice perspectives, in significant portions of 
the food economy.
10
 
                                                        
In 2001, three economists won the Nobel Prize for their work in this area: 
George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz. Their prize-winning work: 
extended the theory when they augmented [it] with the realistic 
assumption of asymmetric information: agents on one side of the 
market have much better information than those on the other side. 
Borrowers know more than the lender about their repayment prospects; 
the seller knows more than buyers about the quality of his car; the CEO 
and the board know more than the shareholders about the profitability 
of the firm; policyholders know more than the insurance company 
about their accident risk; and tenants know more than the landowner 
about their work effort and harvesting conditions. More specifically, 
Akerlof showed that informational asymmetries can give rise to 
adverse selection on markets. Due to imperfect information on the part 
of lenders or prospective car buyers, borrowers with weak repayment 
prospects or sellers of low-quality cars crowd out everyone else from 
the market. Spence demonstrated that under certain conditions, well-
informed agents can improve their market outcome by signaling their 
private information to poorly informed agents. The management of a 
firm can thus incur the additional tax cost of dividends to signal high 
profitability. Stiglitz showed that an uninformed agent can sometimes 
capture the information of a better-informed agent through screening, 
for example by providing choices from a menu of contracts for a 
particular transaction. Insurance companies are thus able to divide their 
clients into risk classes by offering different policies, where lower 
premiums can be exchanged for a higher deductible. 
Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel 2001, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/Laureates 
/2001/public.html (providing additional summaries of Akerlof, Spence, and 
Stigltiz‘s work with citation to their major publications) (last visited Apr. 5, 
2009). 
9 George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 463–95 (1970); Nobelprize.org, supra 
note 8 (―[T]he information problem can either cause an entire market to collapse 
or contract it into an adverse selection of low-quality products.‖). 
10 See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 19–20 (discussing ways in which current 
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A. The Label Playing Field 
Consumers navigate a complicated and highly regulated world 
of food labeling and marketing. Law shapes not only the 
information on packaging, but also how manufacturers formulate 
the food within the package. Three key agencies play central roles 
in administering these laws in the United States: the FDA,
11
 the 
United States Department of Agriculture (―USDA‖),12 and the 
Federal Trade Commission (―FTC‖).13 Once government interferes 
with a consumer market, no matter how legitimate that interference 
may be, it has an ongoing obligation to stay attuned to science, 
public health trends, and consumer preferences as they change over 
time. When government fails to do this, markets become 
increasingly inefficient and ultimately economically and socially 
unhealthy. 
Since the inception of food labeling regulation, the FDA has 
set some of the most informative regulations in the world for label 
disclosure of sodium, sugars, and fats.
14
 In the United States, 
manufacturers must provide this and other food content 
information primarily on the ―nutrition information‖ panel of the 
package.
15
 The FDA also permits the inclusion of nutritional 
claims intended to convince the consumer a particular product is 
healthful.
16
 Examples of these claims include ―low fat,‖ ―low 
sodium,‖ ―reduced cholesterol,‖ and ―lite.‖17   
 
                                                        
food economy encourages purchasing of processed foods). 
11 This article focuses on the FDA‘s authority under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
12 This article focuses on the USDA‘s authority under the Organic Food 
Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2006). 
13 This article focuses on the relationship between FDA and USDA 
standards and complaints brought before the Federal Trade Commission. See 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
14 FDA Food Labeling Rules, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.108 (2009). 
15 FDA Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2009). 
16 FDA Specific Requirements for Health Claims Rules, 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 101.70–101.83 (2009). 
17  FDA Specific Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 101.54–101.69 (2009). 
MCCABE_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:46 PM 
 LOCO LABELS AND MARKETING MADNESS 499 
Despite having some of the best nutritional information in the 
world on labels, however, America‘s obesity, diabetes, metabolic 
syndrome, and heart disease rates have skyrocketed.
18
 This 
phenomenon indicates that the American food economy‘s 
regulatory underpinnings may be promoting an information 
imbalance with negative consequences for public health.
19
 
The FDA and USDA are easy targets to blame for America‘s 
diet going awry—they have a history of yielding to industry 
lobbying and regulating in ways perceived to promote the 
processed food industry.
20
 Although it is the consumer who 
chooses what to buy,
21
 it seems unfair to blame consumers for poor 
                                                        
18 Studies clearly establish the prevalence of obesity and its related 
disorders in American society. See NAT‘L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), NAT‘L HEALTH & NUTRITION 
EXAMINATION STUDY (NHANES), PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 
AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2003–2004, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/overweight/overwght_adult_03.htm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2009); CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), U.S. 
OBESITY TRENDS 1985–2007, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/ 
trend/maps/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009); CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (CDC), OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdp 
hp/dnpa/obesity/index.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (listing the many diseases 
and health conditions for which obese individuals are at an increased risk). 
19 There are many other examples that are beyond the scope of this article. 
One of the most obvious indications that there are serious market problems is 
the current world food crisis. One can only imagine whether the crisis could 
have been avoided if people better understood the national and global food 
economy. See generally PATEL, supra note 2. 
20 MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 143, 154–56 (2006) (―[W]hen it 
comes to solving the nation‘s epidemic of diet-related diseases, Uncle Sam is 
more aligned with Big Food than with the citizens it‘s supposed to represent.‖); 
see also PATEL, supra note 2, at 108–17 (―[I]f we look at the sums donated in 
the US political system . . . we see that the top four companies in many sectors 
of the food system are responsible for more than half the political 
contributions.‖).  
21 See SIMON, supra note 20, at 22. When discussing the problem food 
manufacturers have in acknowledging the rates of diabetes, heart disease, and 
other diet related health problems Simon notes:  
So, many food corporations, trade associations, and industry front 
groups are adopting an intermediary approach: admitting there‘s a 
problem but laying the blame elsewhere—with the individual. Call it 
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choices when they are arguably acting on imperfect information 
about our food. The current regulatory scheme creates labels that 
emphasize the positives where possible, yet are nearly silent about 
the negatives. This scheme, of course, makes sense given our 
capitalist emphasis on consumption and the marketing required to 
ensure goods are consumed.
22
 
However, food is not simply a commodity, a good to be 
manufactured and sold. Science has undeniably linked the quality 
of human diet to human health.
23
 Additionally, while skeptics 
remain, science has linked our agricultural practices to the quality 
of our environment.
24
 Given the human health and environmental 
impacts consumer food choices have, food labels—especially 
processed food labels—should strive for more ―perfect‖ 
information.
25
 Without better information, consumers are misled 
                                                        
the ―personal responsibility‖ strategy. The line of reasoning goes like 
this: it‘s up to each individual to make ―better‖ choices at supermarkets 
and restaurants . . . [c]onsumers who are having difficulty figuring out 
the ―right‖ options for healthier living are simply in need of ―better 
education‖—which food manufacturers and PR mavens are happy to 
supply, but of course only in the most corporate friendly ways.  
Id.  
22 That is not to say that capitalism cannot successfully address 
environmental or health issues. See generally GARY HIRSHBERG, STIRRING IT UP 
(2008). 
23 See sources cited supra note 2 (discussing the relationship between 
human health and diet).   
24 See Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic 
Agriculture for Market-and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1546–47 
(2007) (When analyzing the ―emergence of a cause-based approach to 
environmental reform that seeks fundamental changes in production systems or 
human behavior to prevent environmental harms from arising in the first place,‖ 
Hornstein draws on Rachel Carson‘s Silent Spring, which urged farmers and 
others to forgo the arrogance of controlling nature in favor of agriculture that is 
―based on understanding of the living organisms [farmers] seek to control, and 
of the whole fabric of life to which these organisms belong.‖ RACHEL CARSON, 
SILENT SPRING 278 (First Mariner Books ed. 2002)). 
25 See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. CV-05-01278, 2008 WL 
5273731, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008) (―[W]e do not think that the FDA 
requires an ingredient list so that manufacturers can mislead consumers and then 
rely on the ingredient list to correct those misinterpretations and provide a shield 
for liability for the deception. Instead, reasonable consumers expect that the 
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and our food economy becomes inefficient.
26
  
B. Informing Labels: Science and Marketing 
This article addresses two examples of the ongoing struggle to 
find the proper balance between government regulation, reliable 
science, and consumers‘ demand for information. The examples—
the prolonged debate over salt‘s designation as a ―safe‖ food 
additive and the tension over the National Organic Program—
illustrate that the balance of information and regulation is not yet 
optimal. Furthermore, science and public health play key roles in 
policy review and form the foundation of label policy. Government 
must also consider that other emerging consumer concerns beyond 
food safety, such as environmental impact, animal welfare, and 
social justice for workers and the poor, are playing increasingly 
important roles in food labeling policy making.
27
 
A label‘s front panel is prime real estate—the place to grab the 
consumer. Government and the market can achieve a better 
information balance by providing more ―perfect‖ label information 
on this panel. To better optimize food label regulations, the FDA 
could follow the United Kingdom‘s lead and implement ―negative 
labels‖ that flag foods high in salt, sugar, and/or fat with amber or 
red light symbols.
28
 Similarly, the FDA and USDA could improve 
the information balance by increasing transparency about the 
processes underlying label designations such as ―USDA 
Organic.‖29   
 
                                                        
ingredient list contains more detailed information about the product that 
confirms other representations on the packaging.‖). 
26 See supra notes 7–8. 
27 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 
534 (2004) (noting that ―process preferences can be expected to capture the 
displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals who have been 
encouraged to regard the market as a more sure route to self-expression and 
efficacious activity than traditional public channels‖). See generally PATEL, 
supra note 2. 
28 See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. 
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Consumers make their food choices in the grocery store, which 
also plays a role in shaping purchasing decisions. Accordingly, 
stakeholders such as food manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers 
should also consider marketplace innovations that operate without 
regulation to promote more informed food purchases. Such 
innovation requires the grocery industry taking matters into its own 
hands, as one supermarket chain has already done by providing 
supplemental food information on the grocery shelves to apprise 
the consumer of ―negative‖ information.30 This approach could be 
expanded to include the redesign of grocery stores around health, 
rather than food category. For example, grocery stores could 
design ―green light‖ aisles populated with minimally processed 
foods, or those low in sugar, salt and fat. To innovate, however, 
stakeholders also need to understand where our labeling policies 
can be improved. This article offers two instructive examples and 
then makes recommendations about learning from those 
experiences. 
Part I of this article examines recent FDA public hearing 
proceedings, upon petitions for review, to revisit the Agency‘s 
designation of salt as ―generally regarded as safe‖ under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act. This example illustrates how 
complicated regulating one food additive can be and how the 
FDA‘s slow response to such issues require America to take  a 
fresh look at communicating information about processed food 
ingredients to consumers. 
Part II examines how the National Organic Program (NOP) 
uses niche marketing to help consumers find foods produced 
without antibiotics or pesticides. While NOP is an innovative 
program that promotes an agriculture system that many view as 
sustainable and healthful, critics also claim that it erodes ―true‖ 
organics. There is support for such criticism, as the program 
engenders consumer confusion in the marketplace.
31
 For example, 
                                                        
30 Hannaford Corporation uses the Guiding Stars Rating System to provide 
additional information to consumers about how to rate the healthfulness of 
products. Hannaford, What is Guiding Stars?, http://www.hannaford.com/ 
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); 
see also infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.  
31 See Amanda Thomas, Synthetic Materials and Organic Foods, 24 Agric. 
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many average consumers do not know that organic cookies contain 
many of the same ingredients as conventional cookies. 
Accordingly, NOP illustrates an innovative way of providing better 
information to consumers, although the USDA must work harder 
to educate consumers about the true meaning of its organic 
marketing seal. 
Part III makes suggestions for innovative, effective labeling 
schemes that will promote more efficient food markets. If 
consumers want to eat ―healthy‖ and ―natural‖ foods, our 
regulatory system should allow for that. Similarly, the system 
should allow for consumers to make food purchasing decisions 
based on taste preferences alone, but with fuller disclosure of the 
negative personal, public, and environmental health consequences 
of those decisions.   
I. SALT 
[I]n all ages salt has been invested with a significance far 
exceeding that inherent in its natural properties, interesting 
and important as these are. Homer calls it a divine 
substance, Plato describes it as especially dear to the Gods, 
and we shall presently note the importance attached to it in 
religious ceremonies, covenants and magical charms. That 
this should have been so in all parts of the world and in all 
times shows that we are dealing with a general human 
tendency and not with any local custom, circumstance or 
notion.
32
 
Given this grand description of salt (sodium chloride), what 
should we make of the fact that Mr. Conventional‘s soup contains 
41% of the recommended daily allowance of sodium—a whopping 
82% if he consumes the entire can? Should consumers be 
concerned that the FDA recently held a public hearing
33
 to revisit 
                                                        
L. Update 1, 3 (2007) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.606). 
32 MARK KURLANSKY, SALT, A WORLD HISTORY 2–3 (2002) (quoting 
Ernest Jones‘ 1912 essay on ―the human obsession with salt‖). 
33  Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86) (announcing a public hearing and petition to revise 
the regulatory status of salt and establish food labeling requirements for it). 
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its sodium policy? The hearing, called in response to a petition to 
review salt‘s designation as ―generally regarded as safe‖ (GRAS) 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,
34
 is an important 
chapter in the American story of food labeling.   
Salt serves as a prominent example of how the current 
regulatory system conditions consumers to look for signals that a 
product is ―healthy‖ and the consumer should buy it. However, 
what we really need is a more balanced system that allows 
consumers to make a decision not to purchase, as easily as to 
purchase. While this may seem antithetical to the modern 
American food economy (and it probably is), only with full 
disclosure of a product‘s attributes can we hope to have a food 
economy that functions efficiently by prompting informed 
purchases.
35
 
                                                        
34 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 348 (2006). When a substance is classified as GRAS 
under the FDCA, it can be added to foods without pre-market review. In contrast 
to GRAS, the law defines ―food additive‖ as:  
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be 
expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component 
or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any 
substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, 
processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding 
food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), 
if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified 
by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having 
been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of 
a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either 
scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be 
safe under the conditions of its intended use . . . .  
21 U.S.C. § 321(s). 
35 Certainly, the purpose of the FDCA, supra note 5, provides a touchstone 
for the FDA to revisit issues such as salt if public health data can support the 
Secretary‘s determination that consumers are not getting ―fair‖ information 
about a product‘s attributes. Individual manufacturers may not be at fault in 
terms of providing ―unfair‖ information—it may be that consumption patterns 
(as discussed by journalists such as Pollan and experts such as Nestle, supra 
note 2) change in a way that makes a GRAS designation unwise.   
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A. Is Salt Safe? 
Many scientists agree that excessive salt consumption has dire 
health consequences for most humans,
36
 yet the law classifies it as 
―safe.‖37 Further at odds with the GRAS classification is the 
FDA‘s permission to manufacturers to market foods with health 
claims such as ―low sodium‖ or ―sodium free.‖38 Thus, while 
consumers who seek low sodium products may find them, we are 
generally led to assume that there are no negative health effects of 
salt consumption.   
Public health experts increasingly blame salt for the increased 
risk of heart disease and stroke worldwide.
39
 In the United States, 
                                                        
36 Compare WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REDUCING SALT INTAKE IN 
POPULATIONS (2006), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/red 
ucingsaltintake_EN.pdf [hereinafter WHO SODIUM REPORT] (concluding that 
scientific literature supports the need for government policies for immediate 
reduction in the world food supply to reduce heart disease and stroke) and 
Nancy R. Cook et al., Long-term Effects of Dietary Sodium Reduction on 
Cardiovascular Disease Outcomes: Observational Follow-up with the Trials of 
Hypertension Prevention, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 885 (2007), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/rapidpdf/bmj.39147.604896.55v1 (concluding that 
sodium reduction may also reduce long term risk of cardiovascular disease), 
with Hillel W. Cohen et al., Sodium Intake and Mortality in the NHANES II 
Follow-up Study, 119 AM. J. MED. 275 (2006) (scientific study noting that 
evidence ―linking sodium intake to mortality outcomes is scant and 
inconsistent‖). 
37 An analysis of GRAS classification is beyond the scope of this article. 
For the reader unfamiliar with GRAS standards, it is essential to understand that 
it means either: (1) ―the scientific data and information about the use of a 
substance must be widely known and there must be a consensus among qualified 
experts that those data and information establish that the substance is safe under 
the conditions of its intended use,‖ or (2) ―[f]or a substance used in food before 
1958, a GRAS determination can be made through experience based on common 
use in food. [That is,] . . . a substantial history of consumption in food by a 
significant number of consumers.‖ Paulette Gaynor & Sebestian Cianci, FDA, 
Regulatory Report: FDA’s GRAS Notification Program Works, FOOD SAFETY 
MAG., Dec.–Jan. 2005–2006, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/ 
grasov2.html; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(c), (f). 
38 FDA Specific Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, supra note 17. 
39 See WHO SODIUM REPORT, supra note 36, at 21–22 (noting various 
European groups and companies trying to reduce levels of salt in food content). 
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the American Medical Association sounded the regulatory alarm in 
2006 when it suggested that the FDA remove salt‘s GRAS 
classification.
40
 However, this recent spate of attention is only the 
latest chapter in the effort to regulate salt in processed foods. 
Health and consumer activists‘ demands for closer sodium 
regulation, while ongoing for thirty years, have largely failed. This 
failure suggests either that the government has not kept up with the 
science showing that excess dietary sodium is detrimental to 
human health, despite a legal process to review the safety of GRAS 
substances, or worse, that the government has allowed food 
industry lobbying to supersede science.
41
 
B. Regulatory History 1958–2006 
Salt‘s modern regulatory history commenced in 1958, when the 
Food Additives Amendment of 1958 grandfathered salt as a 
substance ―generally regarded as safe.‖42 This classification means 
that manufacturers are free to add salt to their products as desired, 
rather than it being regulated as a ―food additive‖ requiring pre-
market clearance procedures.
43
 In 1969, the FDA began its 
systematic review of all food ingredients previously listed as 
GRAS without a detailed scientific review, including salt.
44
 The 
FDA contracted with the Federation of American Societies of 
Experimental Biology (FASEB) to evaluate salt‘s safety.45 A 
                                                        
40 Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973, 59,976 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86) (noting that at its July 2006 annual meeting 
the American Medical Association issued a report seeking to remove salt‘s 
GRAS designation). 
41 Another potential rationale for the FDA‘s failure to revise sodium 
standards is simply that it has not been able to allocate resources to the problem, 
given other regulatory demands on the agency. 
42 21 U.S.C. § 321; see also FDA, History of the GRAS List and SCOGS 
Reviews (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/opas 
cogh.html 
43 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). Indeed, some FDA regulations require salt as an 
ingredient in certain branded food, such as cheese. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 133.06 
(2007). 
44 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(e)–(f) (1983). 
45 GRAS Safety Review of Sodium Chloride, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,590, 26,591 
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decade later, the FASEB reported to the FDA: 
[I]t is the prevalent judgment of the scientific community 
that the consumption of sodium chloride in the aggregate 
should be lowered in the United States. The Select 
Committee agrees and favors development of the 
guidelines for restricting the amount of salt in processed 
foods, a major contributor of dietary sodium. Adequate 
labeling of the sodium content of foods would help meet 
these objectives.
46
 
In 1978, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) 
petitioned the FDA in an effort to turn the FASEB‘s findings into 
mandatory regulation, rather than relying on manufacturers‘ 
voluntary salt reductions.
47
 The FDA denied the petition as 
substantively moot, noting that between 1978 and 1982, the agency 
issued its core sodium policy and amendments addressing the 
FASEB report.
48
 Dissatisfied that the FDA adopted voluntary 
guidelines and that the core sodium policy failed to include 
meaningful regulation, the CSPI next sued the FDA.
49
 The district 
court upheld the FDA‘s discretion to deny the CSPI‘s original 
petition.
50
 Specifically, the court ruled that FDA voluntary labeling 
measures contained in its 1982 policy were adequate under the 
law, and that the ―the FDA should be given the opportunity to test 
these methods to determine if food manufacturers will provide 
sodium content labeling and lower the amount of sodium in 
                                                        
(June 18, 1982). 
46 Id. at 26,592. Oddly, the report goes on to note that the scientific 
evidence at the time was inconclusive as to salt‘s effect on a ―significant 
proportion of the public when it is used at levels that are now current and in the 
manner now practiced.‖ Id. at 26,592. 
47 See Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973, 59,975 (proposed Oct. 23, 
2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86); Center for Science in the Public 
Interest v. Novitch, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 38,275 (D.D.C. June 11, 
1984), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/salt_lawsuit.pdf. 
48 Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. at 59,975. 
49 Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Novitch, Food Drug Cosm. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 38,275 (D.D.C. June 11, 1984), available at http://cspinet.org/new 
/pdf/salt_lawsuit.pdf. 
50 Id. 
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processed foods voluntarily.‖51 This decision paved the way for 
another two and half decades of half-measures and regulatory 
leniency that continue the myth that salt, at any level, is ―safe.‖ 
Today, the salt fight is alive once again. In October 2007, the 
FDA announced a public hearing to ―share‖ its current sodium 
policy, likely prompted by a CSPI citizen petition.
52
 Based on past 
proceedings, it again appears that there is little chance that the 
FDA will classify salt as a ―food additive.‖ The question, however, 
is whether the FDA has done enough between 1978‘s FASEB 
report and 2008 to provide accurate, helpful sodium content 
information to American consumers. 
This article argues that the answer is no, although progress has 
been made. In 1984, the FDA adopted various ―health claim‖ 
regulations for sodium.
53
 These rules allow manufacturers to place 
the words ―sodium free,‖54 ―very low sodium,‖55 ―low sodium,‖56  
―reduced sodium,‖57 ―no added salt,‖58 or ―light‖59 on food 
                                                        
51 Id. 
52 Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86).  
53 FDA Nutrient Content Claims for the Sodium Content of Foods, 21 
C.F.R. § 101.61 (2008). But see Food Labeling, 49 Fed. Reg. 15510 (Apr. 18, 
1984) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (noting only five claims).  
54 21 C.F.R. § 101.61(b)(1) (defining ―sodium free‖ as, inter alia, 
containing less than 5 milligrams (mg) of sodium per serving).  
55 Id. at § 101.61(b)(2) (defining ―very low sodium‖ as generally less than 
30–35 mg per serving, depending on the type of food labeled—per serving, 
reconstituted, etc.). 
56 Id. at § 101.61(b)(4) (defining ―low sodium‖ as, inter alia, 140 mg or 
less of sodium per serving). 
57 Id. at § 101.61(b)(6) (defining ―reduced sodium‖ foods as containing at 
least 25% less sodium than the reference food). 
58 Id. at § 101.61(c) (prohibiting the use of ―unsalted‖ or ―no salt added‖ 
unless no salt is added during processing, where the food would usually have 
salt added, and requiring that the product carry the words ―not a sodium free 
food‖ if the product does not meet the definition of ―sodium free‖). 
59 The terms ―light‖ and ―lite‖ are also restricted to products that contain no 
more than 50% of the sodium contained in the ―reference food.‖ Nutrient 
Content Claims for ―Light‖ or ―Lite,‖ 21 C.F.R. § 101.56(c)(1) (2009). The 
―reference food‖ is the regular version of a food. For example a ―light‖ tomato 
soup must have no more than 50% of the sodium in the original. Id.  
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packaging. In 1993, the FDA adopted further labeling requirements 
for sodium. The most important of these requirements established a 
reference value, commonly known to Americans who read labels 
as the ―Daily Value,‖ which sets forth the recommended upper 
threshold for daily sodium consumption.
60
 This value is 2,400 
milligrams of sodium per day
61
 for the average person. 
Among countries with reference values, the American daily 
value recommendation is one of the lowest.
62
 Nonetheless, CSPI 
sought a further reduction of the daily value threshold to 1,500 
milligrams
63
 in its citizens‘ petition filed in November 2005—a 
position that the American Medical Association (AMA) supports.
64
 
The AMA‘s call for revocation of salt‘s GRAS designation is 
striking because it signals that a major organization in the medical-
scientific community believes that there is adequate evidence for 
the FDA to limit the use of salt in processed foods.
65
 The AMA 
also recommends that food manufacturers voluntarily reduce the 
                                                        
60 Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R §§ 101.9(c)(4), (c)(9) (2009); 
Reference Daily Intakes and Daily Reference Values, 58 Fed. Reg. 2206, 2223–
2224 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (discussing various 
proposed values for the daily intake of sodium). See generally Food Labeling 
Revision, 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2176 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
101).  
61 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(9) (2009). 
62 WHO SODIUM REPORT, supra note 36, at 15. 
63 Id. at 19. However, the FDA‘s November 2007 public hearing 
specifically excluded daily value from its scope because daily values are the 
subject of other rulemaking. Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed.Reg. 59,973, 59,976 
(proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86). 
64 See 72 Fed.Reg. at 59,974 (―FDA is aware that other organizations are in 
general agreement with some of the recommendations in CSPI‘s petition. For 
example, at the July 2006 annual meeting of the American Medical Association 
(AMA), the AMA announced recommendations, in the form of a report issued 
by the AMA‘s Council on Science and Health, to the agency echoing many of 
the regulatory actions suggested by CSPI . . . .‖); Barry D. Dickinson & Stephen 
Havas, Reducing the Population Burden of Cardiovascular Disease by Reducing 
Sodium Intake, 167 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1460, 1466 (2007) (noting AMA 
report‘s conclusion that ―the most substantial benefit in reducing [systolic blood 
pressure] was gained from reducing sodium intake from [2.3 g to 1.5 g] per 
day‖). 
65 See generally Dickinson & Havas, supra note 64. 
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amount of sodium in processed foods by fifty percent.
66
  
Unsurprisingly, food manufacturers and industry groups 
oppose the AMA‘s position and its supporters. General Mills, for 
example, argued in its March 28, 2008 written testimony that salt‘s 
GRAS designation was appropriate because ―[r]evocation (of 
GRAS) is not supported by science‖ and ―the multi-functional 
properties of salt (including product safety) make it particularly 
difficult to determine appropriate ceilings across all product 
categories.‖67 The National Restaurant Association similarly 
offered: ―GRAS status is a scientific evaluation that must take 
place within a well-defined legal framework. There is no basis for 
revoking the present status of salt.‖68 Morton Salt suggested that 
―FDA policies should emphasize dietary patterns rather than 
singular nutrients‖ and that ―there is no magic bullet for sodium 
reduction.‖69 
C. Salt in the Twenty-First Century 
What can we learn from the last fifty years of attempts to 
regulate salt in the American food supply? First, the American 
food supply has fallen victim to government‘s preference for 
industry and consumption.
70
 These preferences leave the American 
                                                        
66 Id. 
67 Letter from General Mills to FDA, Comments on Docket No. 2005P-
0450 Salt and Sodium (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov (search 
―FDA-2007-0545-0044.1‖).  
68 Letter from National Restaurant Association to FDA, Comment on 
Docket No. 2005P-0450 (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov (search 
―FDA-2007-0545-0019.1‖). 
69 Comprehensive Outline of Morton Salt to FDA, Public Hearing 
Concerning FDA‘s Policies Regarding Salt (Nov. 20, 2007), 
http://www.regulations.gov (search ―FDA-2007-0545-0030‖).  
70 See generally MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE‘S DILEMMA 55 (2006) 
(quoting farmer George Naylor: ―Agriculture‘s always going to be organized by 
the government; the question is, organized for whose benefit? Now it‘s for 
Cargill and Coca-Cola. It‘s certainly not for the farmer.‖ And I would add, not 
for consumer health.); DEVRA DAVIS, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR ON 
CANCER 419–26 (2007). When recounting the political history of the artificial 
sweetener aspartame, Davis comments that:  
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consumer largely unaware of health dangers. For example, when 
salt first received its GRAS status, manufacturers had just begun to 
package salted potato chips (the chips were previously sold plain 
with a salt packet in the bag).
71
 In 2008, while a consumer may be 
able to find ―low sodium‖ health claims on packaging, what about 
the healthy teenager who buys a bag of Dill Pickle Flavor Lay‘s 
Potato Chips? The packaging does not bear any ―negative‖ 
information, and the teenager must be perceptive enough to know 
that a one-ounce serving (which accounts for one-sixth of the bag) 
contains 15% of the daily recommended sodium intake.
72
 If she 
consumes the whole bag, she will also consume 90% of her daily 
sodium intake. This dramatic example illustrates that while salt 
itself has not changed, the use of the substance in the food supply 
has. This alone should be a sufficient justification for the FDA to 
reconsider GRAS.
73
 
While revocation of GRAS for salt may not be necessary, the 
FDA must at least require more balanced, prominent health 
information on processed food labels. The FDA must consider the 
evolution of our food supply and the effects that this evolution has 
had on human health. Salt provides just one example of myriad 
ways in which our current regulatory scheme subtly promotes 
                                                        
[i]n January 1977, FDA Chief Counsel Richard Merrill made agency 
history. He formally asked the U.S. Attorney‘s office to convene a 
grand jury to decide whether to indict the major producer of aspartame, 
G.D. Searle, for knowingly misrepresenting ―findings, concealing 
material facts and making false statements‖ in aspartame safety tests. 
That this investigation never happened speaks volumes about the 
difficulty of acquiring independent information in commercially 
valuable products.  
DAVIS, supra, at 419–20.  
71 Nibble.com, The History of Potato Chips, http://www.thenibble.com/ 
reviews/main/snacks/chip-history.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (noting that 
chips did not come pre-salted until the 1950‘s). 
72 Fritolay.com, Nutrition Label of Dill Pickle Flavored Potato Chips, 
http://www.fritolay.com/our-snacks/lays-dill-pickle-chips.html (last visited Feb. 
3, 2009) (click on ―See Nutrition Label: Flip the bag‖). 
73 Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,939 (Apr. 17, 
1997) (making the distinction between the substance and its use in foods) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 170). 
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overconsumption and misinformation. Manufacturers‘ ―health 
claims‖ help consumers find and buy ―healthy‖ products without 
the suggestion that perhaps the consumer would be better off in the 
produce section. Why not include ―health claims‖ that help 
consumers understand how to make better food choices, rather than 
just ―positive‖ purchases of ―healthy‖ foods?   
The reason is that our food economy does not support this 
approach, nor does the FDCA or other food labeling laws and 
regulations. As a capitalist society, our system‘s success depends 
on consumption: buy more; eat more; buy it from a corporation; 
eat it in your car on the way to the mall. While this approach has 
been good for corporate America and the economy, it has been a 
disaster for the American diet. The FDA would significantly 
advance its mission of promoting and protecting the public health
74
 
if it required ―balanced‖ label information—mandatory ―high 
sodium‖ instead of voluntary ―low sodium‖; mandatory ―heavy‖ 
instead of voluntary ―light.‖ This idea is not so far-fetched, 
although it may seem so to Americans familiar with the FDA‘s 
history.
75
 
In the United Kingdom, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
adopted a ―traffic light signpost‖ system in 2007.76 The system—
currently voluntary—includes core information about calories, fat, 
sugar and salt on the front of packaging. Other nutritional 
information, such as calcium, must remain separate and comply 
with other regulations.
77
 The categories encompassed by the 
system are assigned one of three levels of ―healthfulness,‖ each 
designated by a color: green, amber or red.
78
 The intended result is 
that consumers easily identify green light foods as more healthful  
 
                                                        
74 Presentation from U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Overview, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/sld001.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  
75 See generally MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 51–66 (rev. & expanded 
ed. 2007); MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 143–65 (Nation Books 2006). 
76 FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY, FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST 
LABELING  -  TECHNICAL GUIDANCE (2007), available at http://www.food.gov 
.uk/multimedia/pdfs/frontofpackguidance2.pdf. 
77 Id. at 2–3. 
78 Id. at 5–6. 
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than red light foods, with yellow light foods requiring 
moderation.
79
  
Consumer research formed the basis of the FSA program, not 
public hearings or pure politics.
80
 The agency found that 
consumers wanted an easier way to determine the content of 
processed foods, which they reported ―difficulty determining the 
nutritional content of.‖81 It therefore specifically recommends 
seven product types for stop light labels: ready-made sandwiches; 
hot and cold prepared meals; burgers and sausages; pies, pastries 
and quiches; breaded formed meat, such as chicken nuggets; 
pizzas; and breakfast cereals.
82
 Manufacturers can use the labels 
more widely than these categories, and likely will do so if they are 
successful in marketing products to consumers in accordance with 
the recommendations. 
The UK based the stop light label criteria on two sources: 
European Union Regulation No. 1924/2006,
83
 recognizing that 
health and nutrition claims must be regulated ―in order to ensure a 
high level of protection for consumers and to facilitate their 
choice‖84 of safe, healthy foods; and recommendations of the UK‘s 
own Committee on Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition Policy 
(COMA) and Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition 
(SACN).
85
   
                                                        
79 Food Standards Agency, Using Traffic Lights to Make Healthier Choices 
3 (2007), available at http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/publication/food 
trafficlight1107.pdf. 
80 The FSA commenced an evaluation project, independently managed by 
the Project Management Panel, with the goal of ―establish[ing] which 
scheme(s), or elements of the scheme(s), best enable consumers to make 
informed choices about the foods they purchase.‖ Food Standards Agency, The 
Independent Evaluation Project, http://www.food.gov.uk/foodlabelling/sign 
posting/signpostevaluation/pmpanel/evaluation/ (last visited Deb. 24, 2009). For 
a catalogue of the panel‘s studies to date, see id. 
81 Id. at 4. 
82 Id. 
83 Council Regulation 1924/2006, Nutrition and Health Claims Made on 
Foods, 2007 O.J. (L12/3). 
84 Id. at 1. 
85 The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition  
is an advisory Committee of independent experts that provides advice 
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The nutritional criteria for each color are similar to American 
labeling guidelines. The sodium levels permitted in a green light 
food are .30 grams per 100 gram serving, resembling the American 
―sodium free‖ standard.86 Manufacturers label products containing 
.3 to 1.5 grams of salt per serving with an amber marking (―low 
salt‖), and products containing more than 1.5 grams per serving 
with red. For fats, products labeled with a green light can have no 
more than 3 grams of fat per 100 gram serving, just as the FDA 
permits a ―low fat‖ label on foods that contain no more than 3 
grams of fat.
87
 A yellow light food, by contrast, can have a fat 
range of 3 to 20 grams, while a red light is used for foods that 
either have greater than 20 grams of fat per 100 grams or 21 grams 
of fat per portion.
88
 Significantly, the FDA has no equivalent of the 
red light designation with respect to sodium or fats—products 
containing more than 1.5 grams of sodium or 20 grams of fat per 
serving carry no special label alerting consumers of that content.
89
 
                                                        
to the Food Standards Agency and Department of Health as well as 
other Government Agencies and Departments. Its remit includes 
matters concerning nutrient content of individual foods, advice on diet 
and the nutritional status of people. Members are appointed as 
independent scientific experts on the basis of their specific skills and 
knowledge. There are also two members to represent consumers.  
Members are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the 
Code of Conduct for Scientific Advisory Committees. Individuals are 
required to declare conflicts of interest and during discussions they may 
be disqualified at the Chairman‘s discretion from contributing to the 
conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.  
The SCAN replaces the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition 
Policy (COMA), but COMA‘s prior work is still referenced in the FSA‘s stop 
light guidelines. See Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition, Chairman‘s 
Introduction, http://www.sacn.gov.uk/about_us/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2009).  
86 Compare GRAS Safety Review of Sodium Chloride, 47 Fed. Reg. 
26,590 26,591 (June 18, 1982), with FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST 
LABELING, supra note 76, at 6.  
87 Nutrient Content Claims for Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of 
Foods, 21 C.F.R. § 101.62 (2009). 
88 FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST LABELING, supra note 76, at 
6. 
89 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(C) (allowing manufacturers to petition to 
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While the FSA program does not ―determine the design of 
individual approaches,‖ it does provide stop light design advice 
based on the consumer research used to develop the program.
90
 
The overarching message of the design guidance is that consumers 
should be able to read the symbols easily and quickly. The 
information advises consumers to eat mainly green and amber 
foods, with red foods ―fine to eat . . . occasionally or as a treat, but 
think about how often you choose it and how much of it you eat.‖91 
The general government message to consumers about the program 
is that ―[h]ealthy eating is all about getting the right overall 
balance.‖92   
While the European Commission rejected adopting the FSA‘s 
approach for all of Europe, there has been a proposal to require at 
least prominent, front-of-package labels for six key pieces of 
nutritional information.
93
 The measures are energy (calories), total 
fat, saturated fat, carbohydrates, sugars and salts.
94
 The proposed 
regulation‘s major purpose is making 
nutrition labeling mandatory in the principal field of vision 
of a food label. It allows for the development of best 
practice in the presentation of nutrition information, 
including alternative forms of expression of the nutrition 
information in relation to overall daily nutrient 
                                                        
make positive health claims based on scientific evidence, but remaining silent on 
labeling the negative attributes of foods). 
90 FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST LABELING, supra note 76, at 
9. 
91
 USING TRAFFIC LIGHTS TO MAKE HEALTHIER CHOICES, supra note 79, at 
3; see also Food Standards Agency, Using Traffic Lights to Make Healthier 
Choices, http://www.eatwell.gov/uk/foodlabels/trafficlights/?lang=en (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2009).  
92 USING TRAFFIC LIGHTS TO MAKE HEALTHIER CHOICES, supra note 79, at 
2.   
93 Stephen Castle and Elisabeth Rosenthal, EU Plans Food Labels to Cut 
Rates of Obesity, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/30/europe/fat.php.   
94 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Provision of Food Information to Consumers, COM 
(2008) 40 final (Jan. 30, 2008).  
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requirements or graphical forms of presentation.
95
 
Even though some were disappointed that the EU declined the 
traffic light system, the fact that the UK has successfully launched 
the system and that the EU is contemplating label redesign should 
alert American regulators and manufacturers that change is afoot. 
One American supermarket chain has already launched a 
program providing consumers with more information with the 
intent to help them make healthier food choices. Hannaford 
Company‘s ―Guiding Stars‖ is a program for ―nutritious shopping 
made simple.‖96 An ―expert panel of scientists‖97 who evaluate 
foods based on the most current scientific information, including 
the 2005 Federal Dietary Guidelines for Americans, advises the 
company‘s program. The panel then assigns one (good), two 
(better), or three (best) stars to products. A product can also earn 
no stars, indicating it is not a good dietary choice.
98
 These stars 
allow consumers to pick foods with more vitamins, minerals, fiber, 
and whole grains and less saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, added 
sugars, and added salts.
99
 
Hannaford stores display the star system on the shelf for 
consumers to easily view while shopping. The program‘s web 
guide also details how products are evaluated, who evaluates them, 
and how consumers benefit from the program. The program is 
marketed as having six core attributes: it‘s easy, it‘s fun, it‘s fast, 
it‘s good for you, it‘s grounded in science, and it‘s fair.100 This 
program is one that other food retailers will likely adopt and is a 
powerful example of the private market providing additional 
                                                        
95 Id. 
96 What is Guiding Stars?, supra note 30.  
97 Hannaford, Scientific Advisory Panel, http://www.hannaford.com/ 
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/scientific_advisory.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2009).  
98 Hannaford, How Guiding Stars Works, http://www.hannaford.com/ 
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/how_guiding_stars_work.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2009).  
99 What is Guiding Stars?, supra note 30. 
100 Hannaford, Benefits of Guiding Stars, http://www.hannaford.com/ 
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/benefits.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 
2009).  
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information to the consumer. 
However, the program also raises excellent questions about the 
future of information in the food economy. Had the federal 
government been more responsive to issues such as those 
involving salt well before national organizations began to call for 
rescinding GRAS, perhaps Guiding Stars would not be necessary. 
Alternatively, perhaps a private labeling system will be more 
trusted by consumers than politicized federal regulations. In any 
event, the federal government should take note of the Guiding 
Stars program and encourage more innovation in information 
exchange between manufacturers and consumers. It already has a 
starting point: The National Organic Program. 
II. MORE FROM MARKETING PROGRAMS?  THE NATIONAL ORGANIC 
PROGRAM 
The primary reason that I paid more than Mr. Conventional at 
the grocery store was that I bought organic products.
101
 Should I 
have? The National Organic Program (NOP) is simply a marketing 
tool.
102
 As the program ages, it faces increasing criticism that it 
misleads consumers who purchase organics for health or social 
concerns.
103
 However, the USDA Organic symbol is not an icon of 
health and purity, or even safety.   
The NOP represents a positive innovation in promoting 
consumer education. It marks a substantial step towards informing 
consumers about the process by which their foods are made.
104
 The 
                                                        
101 See National Organic Food Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 
(2006); 7 C.F.R. Part 205 (2008). 
102 USDA, NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
(Oct. 2002, updated Apr. 2008), available at www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ 
getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004443 (―The NOP is a marketing program 
housed within the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. Neither the OFPA nor 
the NOP regulations address food safety or nutrition.‖).  
103 See generally A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the 
Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big Organic and Other Legal 
Challenges for the Industry’s Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L., 17, 59 
(2007); Michelle T. Friedland, You Call that Organic? The USDA’s Misleading 
Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379 (2005). 
104 Hornstein, supra note 24, at 1551; see also M.L. Louriero et al., 
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objective standards, while not perfect as discussed below, at least 
give consumers information that they can use not only to make 
purchasing decisions, but to hold manufacturers accountable for 
failing to meet certain standards.
105
 This feature of NOP is 
extremely important to consumers, especially given the FDA‘s 
position that genetically engineered foods are presumed safe under 
the FDCA.
106
 It also promotes economic efficiency because 
consumers can find the products they want. In turn, their purchases 
signal manufacturers that there is demand for organic products. 
A. Marketing Logo Helps Consumers Avoid Genetically 
Engineered Foods 
The FDA‘s Notice in 1992 presuming that genetically 
engineered foods were ―generally regarded as safe‖ was 
controversial because many consumers believed then, and still do 
today, that such foods are in fact unsafe.
107
 The petitioners in 
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala challenged FDA‘s issuance of 
the Notice, claiming that the Agency‘s position on genetically 
engineered foods required rulemaking in accordance with the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
108
 The court 
                                                        
Assessing Consumer Preferences for Organic, Ecolabeled, and Regular Apples, 
26 J. OF AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 404, 413–14 (2002) (analyzing niche 
market for eco-labeled apples when compared to organic or conventional apples 
and concluding that the organic label may be preferable to an eco-label if 
production costs are the same). 
105 See infra notes 128–56 and accompanying text. 
106 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. May 29, 1992) (notice) 
(―[C]onsumers must be informed, by appropriate labeling, if a food derived from 
a new plant variety differs from its traditional counterpart such that the common 
or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue 
exists to which consumers must be alerted.‖); see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) 
(providing that any substance that becomes a compound of food is a food 
additive). 
107 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(granting defendant-FDA‘s motion for summary judgment on issues of 
genetically engineered food‘s notice requiring rulemaking). 
108 Id. at 172. 
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rejected this argument, specifically finding that the FDA properly 
classified the Notice as a ―policy statement‖ rather than a 
substantive rule.
109
 This was the proper outcome because the 
FDA‘s Notice created no new binding rules for genetically 
engineered foods and only served to clarify that the FDCA‘s 
standard requirements for food additives apply equally to such 
foods.
110
   
The FDA‘s presumption that genetically engineered foods are 
GRAS rested on its determination that ―the only substances added 
to rDNA engineered foods are nucleic acid proteins, generally 
recognized as not only safe but also necessary for survival.‖111 
While the petitioners claimed that this position was contrary to 
statute and that the FDA‘s Notice was ―arbitrary and capricious,‖ 
the court disagreed, reasoning that the petitioners failed to dispute 
the FSA‘s position that nucleic acid proteins are GRAS.112 Rather, 
the petitioners argued that the safety of such proteins in genetically 
engineered foods was unknown.
113
 Reviewing the GRAS standard, 
the court ultimately concluded that there was no scientific evidence 
that the presumption of safety was unwarranted.
114
 However, in 
                                                        
109 Id. (―A substantive rule, which must undergo a formal notice-and-
comment process is a rule that ‗implement[s]‘ a statute and has ‗the force and 
effect of law . . . [p]olicy statements, on the other hand, are statements issued by 
an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency 
proposed to exercise a discretionary power.‘‖ (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 302 n.29 (1979)).  
110 See id. (―[T]he statement does not declare that transferred genetic 
material will be considered GRAS; rather, it announces that such material is 
presumed to be GRAS. This presumption of safety is rebuttable because the 
FDA will require food additive petitions in cases where safety questions exist 
sufficient to warrant formal pre-market review by FDA to ensure public health 
protection.‖) (emphasis in original, internal citations and quotations omitted). 
111 Id. at 176 (citing Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant 
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990). 
112 Id. at 177. The petitioner did not challenge the safety of nucleic acid 
proteins, but rather attempted to argue that nucleic acid proteins may not be 
GRAS when in genetically engineered foods. Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 178–79 (―To be generally 
recognized as safe, a substance must meet two criteria: 1) it must have technical 
evidence of safety, usually in published scientific studies, and 2) this technical 
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2001, the FDA did replace the GRAS presumption with a rigorous 
pre-market notice procedure.
115
 While that process is probably 
somewhat reassuring to consumers who are aware of it, the fact 
that manufacturers do not have to label genetically engineered 
foods is not.
116
 
Understanding that the FDA views genetically engineered 
foods as materially the same as their conventional counterparts is 
key to understanding how, as a consequence, consumers have no 
leverage to demand labels disclosing the presence of genetically 
engineered foods or ingredients.
117
 The determination of 
materiality ―is a factual predicate to the requirement of 
labeling.‖118 Unless the FDA classifies genetically engineered 
foods as ―materially‖ different from their conventional 
counterparts, the agency lacks the legal authority to require 
labeling.
119
 Accordingly, it allows genetically engineered foods to 
be marketed for human consumption without labels disclosing the 
presence of genetically engineered ingredients. This is so as long 
as the genetically engineered ingredient passes the pre-market 
procedure.
120
 Thus, when a genetically engineered food complies 
with the pre-market procedure and the FDA approves it, consumers 
have no legal argument that genetically engineered foods are 
                                                        
evidence must be generally known and accepted in the scientific community. 
See 21 C.F.R. 170.30 (a-b) . . . .‖). 
115 Pre-market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 
(proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 and 592). 
116 Einsiedel, supra note 3, at 232.  
117 Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d. at 179 (―Plaintiffs fail to 
understand the limitation on the FDA‘s power to consider consumer demand 
when making labeling decisions because they fail to recognize that the 
determination that a product differs materially from the type of product it 
purports to be is a factual predicate to the requirement of labeling.‖). 
118 Id.  
119 Id. (―Only once materiality has been established may the FDA consider 
consumer opinion to determine whether a label is required to disclose a material 
fact.‖ Thus, ―if there is a [material] difference, and consumers would likely want 
to know about the difference, then labeling is appropriate. If, however, the 
product does not differ in any significant way from what it purports to be, then it 
would be misbranding to label the product as different, even if consumers 
misperceived the product as different.‖) (citation omitted). 
120 Id. 
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materially different from their conventional counterparts.
121
 There 
is no indication that the FDA will change its approach to 
genetically engineered foods because there is little scientific reason 
to do so.
122
 Therefore, consumers must rely on voluntary labeling 
of ―no genetically engineered ingredients‖ on foods or purchase 
100% USDA Organic foods. This information is provided, though 
not perfectly, by NOP labeling and standards. 
Consumers can rely on the USDA Organic icon to indicate a 
food producer has followed the NOP regulations that exclude use 
of genetically engineered ingredients during production.
123
 
However, consumers cannot rely on the icon to indicate that food 
is actually free of genetically engineered ingredients.
124
 The NOP 
regulations do not set a zero tolerance level for genetically 
engineered substances or pesticides and tolerate unintentional 
                                                        
121 ―Materially different‖ is a reference to 21 U.S.C. § 321(n). See Alliance 
for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. at 178 (―21 U.S.C. § 321(n), grants the FDA 
limited authority to require labeling. In general, foods shall be deemed 
misbranded if their labeling ‗fails to reveal facts . . . material with respect to 
consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling 
. . . relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling . . . or under 
such conditions of use as are customary or usual.‘  21 U.S.C. § 321(n).‖). 
122 There is no scientific evidence that genetically engineered foods that 
have gone through the pre-market clearance process pose a safety risk to 
humans. Genetically engineered foods are considered safe once they have FDA 
approval for human consumption (or animal consumption if used in animal feed 
for stock intended for human consumption). See Linda Bren, Genetic 
Engineering: the Future of Foods?, FDA CONSUMER MAG. (2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/603_food.html (―If a food does not meet 
the safety standards, the FDA has the authority to take it off the market.‖); see, 
e.g., FDA, List of Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods (Feb. 
2009), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biocon.html. 
123 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.2, 205.105(e) (2009) (restricting the use of the ―100% 
organic‖ label to foods produced without ―Excluded methods,‖ which are 
defined as ―a variety of methods used to genetically modify organisms or 
influence their growth and development by means that are not possible under 
natural conditions . . . including . . . recombinant DNA technology.‖). 
124 Friedland, supra note 103, at 397 (indicating that the standards only 
govern the producer‘s intentional actions, and accordingly, a violation may not 
occur even if an excluded substance is detected). 
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exposure to excluded methods of production.
125
 Additionally, if 
certified products do not meet the NOP standards, then there is a 
process to decertify the producer.
126
 However, there is no 
affirmative requirement that foods labeled organic be tested for 
compliance with the regulations.
127
 
B. The USDA Organic Model Allows Consumers to Demand 
Compliance 
Given the criticism of NOP and consumer concerns over 
genetically engineered foods and pesticide residue, it is somewhat 
surprising that the first widely reported decertification process 
involves milk production, rather than produce.
128
 Even more 
interesting is that core issues of the case—non-compliant dairies 
profiting from high organic milk prices but providing non-
compliant organic milk to consumers—are primarily economic 
rather than public health complaints.
129
 For several years, the 
Cornucopia Institute,
130
 a grassroots organization whose motto is 
―Promoting Economic Justice for Family-Scale Farming,‖ has been 
monitoring the organic dairy industry.
131
 The organization‘s 
mission is to protect smaller farms, so it was particularly interested 
in whether larger scale organic dairies were indeed following NOP 
regulations. Its research suggested that some large-scale operators 
                                                        
125 Id. However, courts have held producers liable for failure to prevent 
commingling of foods that contaminated organic food supplies. See In re 
Starlink Corn Prod. Liab. Lit., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841–43 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(examining liability where genetically engineered corn not approved for human 
consumption contaminated consumer food products). 
126 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.405 (outlining the decertification process). 
127 Friedland, supra note 103, at 391–97. 
128 See infra notes 131–50 and accompanying text. 
129 Since many consumers claim to buy organic for health reasons, it would 
seem that ―purity‖ of organic products might have been the first well-known 
case of non-compliance. Instead, Cornucopia‘s work focuses on the economic 
impact that large-scale farming has on small, family operations. See Cornucopia 
Institute, http://www.cornucopia.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
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were not.
132
   
As a result, in November 2005 the Cornucopia Institute 
complained to the USDA that Aurora Organic Dairy did not have 
sufficient pasture to meet the NOP standards.
133
 A subsequent 
investigation by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service‘s NOP 
confirmed that Aurora was not in compliance with the NOP 
regulations.
134
 In April 2007, the USDA notified Aurora that it 
would revoke its organic standard for its Platteville, Colorado 
facility.
135
 By August of that year, the USDA and Aurora entered 
into a consent agreement requiring the facility to satisfy various 
conditions and requiring Aurora to submit new organic systems 
plans, as well as imposing a one-year probationary review 
period.
136
   
The agreement sets eight specific requirements.
137
 Aurora must 
allow lactating and dry (non-lactating) cows on pasture daily 
during the growing season,
138
 clarifying that lactation is not a stage 
of production that would exempt cows from accessing 
pasturage.
139
 Aurora must also reduce its herd size in relation to the 
pasture size; the herd must be sized for four lactating cows per acre 
                                                        
132 ALAN KASTEL, CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE, MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY 
OF ORGANIC MILK 16–17 (2006), http://cornucopia.org/dairysurvey/Organic 
DairyReport/cornucopia_milkintregrity.pdf.   
133 USDA, Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/ (search ―aurora consent agreement q&a,‖ click on 
first entry) [hereinafter Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT]; see also 
Press Release, USDA, Aurora Organic Dairy Signs Consent Agreement with 
USDA‘s Agricultural Marketing Service (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.usda.gov/ 
(click ―Newsroom,‖ click ―Latest Releases,‖ Choose ―August‖ and ―2007‖ from 
dropdown options, click on ―Aug 29, 2007 Aurora Organic Dairy Signs Consent 
Agreement with USDA‘s Agricultural Marketing Service‖).  
134 Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133. 
135 Consent Agreement M-005-06, ¶ 2 (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.ams. 
usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5063456&acct=nopgeninfo 
[hereinafter Consent Agreement]. 
136 Id. ¶ 11–14. 
137 Q & A‘S ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133. 
138 The growing season is generally considered to be May 1 through 
September 30 in Platteville, Colorado. See Consent Agreement, supra note 135, 
¶ 7(c); Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133. 
139 Q & A‘S ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133. 
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and five dry cows per acre.
140
 In addition, calves must be allowed 
to remain at Platteville until they are weaned and ready for pasture, 
which is usually around four to six months.
141
 Aurora must also 
remove certain cows that it improperly transitioned into the 
organic herd.
142
   
Moreover, non-compliance with any of the agreement‘s terms 
during the one-year probationary period may trigger resumption of 
the decertification process.
143
 Additional provisions include that 
Aurora shall bear the costs both of inspection at its Platteville 
facility, should the USDA choose to conduct one, and certification 
resulting from full compliance with its obligations by October 15, 
2008.
144
 However, these administrative requirements are not the 
only challenge that Aurora must face. 
In December 2007, Aurora became the defendant in a class 
action suit for allegedly selling ―milk and milk products which it 
purports to be organic—and for which it charges the higher organic 
price—but which it produces without adherence to federal law.‖145 
The multidistrict litigation has since been centralized in the Eastern 
District of Missouri,
146
 and now names Wal-Mart, Safeway, Wild 
Oats, Target, and Costco as co-defendants.
147
 The basic complaint 
is that non-compliance with NOP while using the USDA Organic 
label deceived consumers who paid the premium price.
148
 
The Aurora complaints illustrate how the improved exchange 
of information empowers the consumer. The NOP standards are 
                                                        
140 Consent Agreement, supra note 135, ¶ 7(d), (e). 
141 Id. ¶ 7(d). 
142 Id. ¶ 7(a), (b). 
143 Id. ¶13. 
144 Id. ¶¶ 13(c), 14. 
145 Complaint ¶ 2, West v. Aurora Dairy Corp., No. 07-02625 (D.C. Colo. 
Dec. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Aurora Dairy Complaint]. 
146 Transfer Order, In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 20, 2008) (MDL No. 
1907)). 
147 Practice and Procedure Order Upon Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(a) ¶ 1, In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 4:08MD01907 ERW (Mar. 14, 2008) (MDL No. 1907); Schedule CTO-1, 
Tag-Along Actions. 
148 Aurora Dairy Complaint, supra note 145, ¶¶ 27–33. 
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quite clear about pasturage and compliance timeframes for organic 
dairies.
149
 Cornucopia Institute did not need to engage in complex 
testing or scientific analysis of Aurora‘s milk, as it could simply 
rely on eyewitness reports of herd size and photographs to find 
NOP violations.
150
 
With the successful action against Aurora initiated, Cornucopia 
has since filed additional NOP non-compliance complaints with 
USDA. On February 16, 2005, it wrote to the NOP compliance 
office that a certified organic dairy in California denied pasture 
access for its 3000 head herd.
151
 Again, Cornucopia relied on 
information from workers, but also from having other dairy 
professionals simply drive by the facility on clear days and 
observing no cows in the pasture.
152
 Whether this will result in 
action against the farm remains to be seen, but the impact of 
―watchdog‖ organizations will play an important role in the future 
of NOP. 
Cornucopia Institute has not limited its complaints to specific 
farming operations. On May 10, 2008, it made a broader complaint 
against Dean Foods and the influence of large corporations on 
NOP.
153
 The phenomenon of large corporate players in the organic 
market is a hot button issue for many, including consumers.
154
 
                                                        
149 NOP‘s dairy provisions have been controversial from their inception.  
Due to the high costs of converting conventional to organic dairies, the 
regulations have certain provisions that attempt to cushion the financial impacts 
of organic milk production at the cost, some believe, of the ―organic ideal.‖   See 
Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237 (1st Cir. 2007); Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 
28, 33 (1st Cir. 2005). 
150 See Cornucopia Institute, Aurora Factory Farm Photos, 
http://www.cornucopia.org/index.php/horizon-factory-farm-photo-gallery/ 
aurora-factory-farm-photo-gallery/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); Letter from Will 
Fantle, Codirector, The Cornucopia Institute to Phyllis Fong, USDA – Office of 
Inspector General (Feb. 16, 2005), www.organicconsumers.org/artman2/ 
uploads/1/OIG_Letter.pdf. 
151 Letter from Will Fantle, Codirector, The Cornucopia Institute to Eileen 
Broomell,  NOP Compliance, USDA (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.cornucopia. 
org/case-vander-eyk-jr-dairy-farm. 
152 See id. 
153 Letter from Will Fantleto Phyllis Fong, supra note 150. 
154 Dr. Phillip Howard, Organic Industry Structure, https://www.msu.edu/~ 
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However, Cornucopia‘s complaint goes beyond the standard 
philosophical ideal that organics are off-limits to large 
corporations. The complaint demands an investigation into why, 
unlike the investigation of Aurora and other organic dairies with 
compliance problems, complaints against Dean‘s Horizon facility 
in Idaho were ignored. The Cornucopia Institute called upon the 
Inspector General ―to review this matter and determine why an 
investigation never took place at Dean/Horizon‘s Idaho factory 
farm [and] . . . to determine why the apparent double standard, in 
terms of enforcement exists.‖155 It further cautioned that ―[t]he 
integrity of the organic label and the integrity and reputation of the 
USDA are at stake.‖156 
Lawmakers should take note of Cornucopia‘s complaints, as 
well as the class action related to the information revealed in those 
complaints. These activities demonstrate that consumers, when 
provided with enough information, can and will proactively 
demand that food meets its labeled standard.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
NOP serves as an excellent illustration of how transparent 
information influences the marketplace. While NOP still has a long 
way to go to educate consumers about what ―USDA Organic‖ 
means, it is on the right path. The FDA should take notice of how a 
marketing program can provide information consumers want, 
while also balancing the needs of producers. If the FDA did take 
notice, it might be inclined to follow the UK‘s traffic light label 
examples noted above.
157
  
Optimizing information in the food economy is no simple task. 
As labeling analysts have noted, ―as with any policy, the costs and 
benefits of government intervention in labeling must be weighed, 
and the sometimes conflicting demands of economic efficiency, 
consumer and producer concerns, public opinion, political 
                                                        
howardp/organicindustry.html (presenting various charts showing ownership of 
organic food companies) (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
155 Letter from Will Fantle to Phyllis Fong, supra note 150, at 2–3. 
156 Id. at 3.  
157 See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
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expediency, and current events must be sorted and evaluated.‖158 
The circumstances surrounding the UK, Hannaford, and the NOP 
all illustrate how information exchange can change consumers‘ 
view and power in the marketplace. Conversely, the American 
milk controversy illustrates how limiting information leads to 
misinformed consumers and market inefficiencies. 
Better information exchange in the food economy also leads to 
better data for manufacturers and policy makers. The traffic light 
label system, for example, links scientific evidence of healthy 
eating habits with a simple way to signal consumers how to eat 
healthily. The real test of that system, as well as Hannaford‘s 
Guiding Stars, is whether purchasing patterns will be altered. If 
consumers purchase and demand more ―green light‖ or ―three star‖ 
options, manufacturers can produce more products to meet that 
demand. Should consumer patterns not be altered or should they 
prove that ―red light‖ or no star options remain popular, there is 
then a signal to government that its health message is not clear, or 
that people do not care to manage their health. If it is the former, 
then government has information that can help it better allocate its 
educational resources. If it is the latter, then lawmakers and policy 
analysts must grapple with how to allocate the costs of 
irresponsible citizens.   
The food economy is a complex mix of law and economics, 
among other things.  In the current food economy, law trumps 
economics in the sense that the constraints of the FDCA, FTC, 
USDA, and even commercial speech govern what information 
most consumers receive. Given the decline of public health as a 
result of obesity and environmental troubles related to agriculture, 
one can only imagine that the information exchange between food 
manufacturers and consumers is accelerating the ―race to the 
bottom‖ that Akerlof predicts whenever there is asymmetric 
information.
159
 While economic modeling is valuable to proving 
the phenomenon, rebalancing the flow of information in the food 
economy will require lawmakers to revisit our currently regulatory 
scheme. The sooner, the better. 
                                                        
158 Golan, supra note 3, at 1. 
159 See discussion supra note 8. 
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Appendix A: The Shopping List
160
 
 
My Purchases/Per 
Serving Nutritional 
Information 
Total 
Cost/Package 
Size/Serving 
Front Pack Label 
Information/Claims 
Kashi Pesto Pasta 
Calories 290  
Sodium 750 mg 
Fat 11 grams 
Sugars 4 grams 
$3.99/10 ounces 
/One Serving 
All Natural 
Olivia‘s Organic Salad 
Calories 15 
Sodium 60 g 
Fat 0 g 
Sugars 0g 
$3.99/ 5 ounces/ 
2 cups (85 
grams) 
USDA Organic 
Zinfandel Low Fat 
Vinaigrette 
Calories 60  
Sodium  480 mg 
Fat 2.5 g 
Sugars  7 g 
 
$3.99/8 
ounces/2 
tablespoons (29 
grams) 
Low Fat 
Store Brand Organic 
Milk 
Calories 90  
Sodium 130 mg 
Fat 0 g 
Sugars 12 g 
$3.99/ half 
gallon/8 ounce 
glass 
USDA Organic 
Late July Dark 
Chocolate Sandwich 
Cookies 
Calories 150 
Sodium 125 mg 
Fat 6 g 
Sugars 9 g 
$3.99/ 8.2 
ounces/ 3 
cookies (33 
grams) 
USDA Organic 
                                                        
160 All prices surveyed on July 10, 2008 at Shaw‘s Supermarket and 
Concord Co-op Market in Concord, New Hampshire, USA. 
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TOTALS 
Calories 605 
Sodium 1545 mg 
Fat 19.5 g 
Sugars 32 g 
Total Cost 
$19.95 
 
Mr. Conventional’s 
Purchases/Nutritional 
Information 
Total 
Cost/Package 
Size/Serving 
Front Pack Label 
Information/Claims 
Progresso Soup Rich n‘ 
Hearty Steak and 
Russett Potato   
Calories 140 (280) 
(whole can)  
Sodium 990  (1980) mg 
Fat 1.5  (3.0) g 
Sugars 3 (6) g 
$1.89/ 18.5 
ounces/ ½ Can 
(246 grams) 
None 
Iceberg Salad Mix 
Calories 15 
Sodium 0 g 
Fat 0 g 
Sugars 2 g 
$2.29/ 16 
ounces/ 1.5 
cups (85 grams) 
None 
Creamy Greek Dressing 
Calories  160 
Sodium  160 mg 
Fat 16 g 
Sugars  3 g 
$3.99/8 
ounces/2 
tablespoons (29 
grams) 
None 
Store Brand Whole 
Milk 
Calories  150 
Sodium 125 mg 
Fat 8 g 
Sugars 12 g 
$2.50/ half 
gallon/ 1 cup 
None 
Oreos 
Calories 160 
Sodium 190 mg 
Fat 7g  
Sugars 14g 
$2.50/18 
ounces/ 34 
grams – no 
cookie number 
listed 
None 
TOTALS Total Cost  
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Calories 625 
Sodium 1465 mg 
Fat 32.5 g 
Sugars 34 g 
 
$13.17 
 
 
